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RESTITUTION-1956 TENNESSEE SURVEY
JOHN W. WADE*
The pervasive principle of Restitution-that "A person who has been
unjustly enriched at the expense of another is required to make
restitution to the other"'-makes use of many remedies, both at law
and in equity. This year's Restitution cases will be classified accord-
ing to the nature of the remedy.
Subrogation and Indemnity
One who pays the obligation of another may be entitled to in-
demnity, if he has not acted officiously. He may also be entitled to the
remedy of subrogation, permitting him to "step into the shoes" of
the person to whom ,he paid and enforce any lien or right which that
person may have against the obligor. One illustration of these reme-
dies is given in State v. Perry,2 involving the right given by statute
to the Tennessee Department of Welfare to collect from a husband
or father amounts paid by it for the support of a dependent wife or
children.3 Two cases illustrate subrogation in connection with work-
men's compensation. The statute provides that when an employee is
injured by a third party tortfeasor and the employer pays under the
Workmen's Compensation Act he is "subrogated to the extent of the
amount paid or payable under such law" and has a lien on any
amount collected by the employee or can himself sue the third party
subject to certain restrictions.4 Reece v. York holds that when the
employee receives a recovery from the third party, payment of work-
men's compensation installments by the employer is deferred "until the
sum total of the net credits of weekly installments that would have
accrued from the date of the injury would be equal to the net credit"
of the recovery.
6
United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Elam7 involved payment
to an employee by the insurance carrier of the employer of an amount
for medical expenses greater than that required by the workmen's
compensation statute. The employee later brought suit against a
third party tortfeasor and plaintiff (employer's insurer) intervened.
The employee then entered into a settlement with defendants, who
* Dean, Vanderbilt University School of Law; member, Tennessee Bar.
1. RESTATEmENT, RESTITUTION § 1 (1937).
2. 280 S.W.2d 919 (Tenn. 1955).
3. TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-908 (1956).
4. Id. § 50-914.
5. 288 S.W.2d 448 (Tenn. 1956).
6. Id. at 450.
7. 278 S.W.2d 693 (Tenn. 1955).
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agreed to indemnify the employee for anything he might have to
pay the intervening insurance company. The court held that the in-
surance company was entitled to recover for the full amount ex-
pended. It summarizes its conclusion in this lucid fashion: -
An employer who provides for the payment of excess medical and
hospital services is not an intermeddler or a volunteer because:
(1) He is satisfying a moral obligation.
(2) He has a substantial interest in restoring his employees to service
and in maintaining good will by the knowledge of the protection afforded
them.
(3) The provision of such excess medical and hospital protection is
in accord with the beneficent intention of the Legislature in passing the
Workmen's Compensation Act.
(4) The provision of adequate medical and hospital services for the
rehabilitation of every injured employee is in keeping with sound public
policy.
In the case at bar the intervenor furnished the excess medical and
hospital services under an agreement in its policy providing for conven-
tional subrogation to the right of the employer and employee against
the third party, and the employee's agreement to such subrogation will
be implied by his having accepted the payment from intervenor of
these excess medical and hospital services.8
Rescission
Cancellation of a deed for fraud was declared in. Anderson v.
Nichols,9 where the court discusses "badges of fraud" at length and in-
dicates that they place the burden of proof on the defendant to es-
tablish validity of the deed. Tucker v. Simmons'o involved a bill in
equity to rescind a release on the ground that it was induced by fraud
and to recover adequate damages. The court affirmed the action of the
chancellor in sustaining a demurrer to the bill, since the action was for
unliquidated damages to the person. Complainants "could have pro-
ceeded in the law court and there had the release set aside and then
could have obtained judgment for what unliquidated damages they
were entitled to."" For this reason, resort to equity for rescission
was unnecessary.
Miller v. Hubbs12 was an action to set aside transfers made by a
woman on her death bed while under the influence of drugs. The
chancellor set aside two transfers because they were made without
independent advice but upheld the major transfer on the ground that
it was made in accordance with the wishes of her deceased husband
and was warranted by the circumstances.
8. Id. at 704.
9. 286 S.W.2d 96 (Tenn. App. M.S. 1955).
10. 287 S.W.2d 19 (Tenn. 1956).
11. Id. at 21.
12. 285 S.W.2d 527 (Tenn. 1955).
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White v. Mid-City Motor Co. 13 and Huddleston v. Lee14 both involve
rescission of a contract of sale because of breach of contract by the
seller. In the first case there was a failure to supply good title and
in the second a breach of warranty of merchantable quality. Under the
sales act rescission is one of several available remedies. Both cases
held that the buyer had not acted in such a fashion as to elect to
abide by the sale or to waive his right to rescission.
Quasi-Contract and Equitable Accounting
In Patrick v. Skinner15 equitable accounting was held to be proper
relief for a joint adventure. Said the court: "The appellant is en-
titled to a proper accounting on the joint adventure and will be
entitled to show, if he can, that monies belonging to the joint ad-
venture have been improperly diverted to other uses . ...- 16
In Peavy v. Wilker,17 plaintiff broker had a 30-day exclusive listing
contract from defendant to sell his property. Plaintiff negotiated with
one Bryan, who finally decided that he was more interested in rent-
ing than buying. Defendant declined to consider renting until five
days after the listing contract had expired; he then rented to Bryan
with an option for purchase within the 10-year period of the lease.
The court held that the chancellor was correct in giving a conditional
decree for the broker's commission in the event Bryan exercised his
option to purchase. It declared that "to permit defendant to ex-
ploit the services of complainant would amount to constructive
fraud" and that since plaintiff was "the procuring cause ... recovery
should be allowed."' 8 This may be explained either as recovery on the
contract or in quasi-contract for the unjust enrichment.
Shirley v. State19 "involves the question of whether or not the court
will return to those engaged in an unlawful gambling game money
taken from the participants of the game by the Sheriff and
turned over to the County Court Clerk."20 There is involved here a
conflict between the principle of unjust enrichment and the policy of
declining to give aid to parties involved in an illegal transaction. The
latter policy-expressed by the maxim, In pari delicto potior est
conditio defendentis-prevails as a general rule, but there are many
exceptions to the maxim.21 Under the precise facts of the instant case,
13. 284 S.W.2d 689 (Tenn. App. E.S. 1955).
14. 284 S.W.2d 705 (Tenn. App. M.S. 1955), 24 TENN. L. REV. 621 (1956).
15. 288 S.W.2d 726 (Tenn. 1956).
16. Id. at 731.
17. 284 S.W.2d 1 (Tenn. App. E.S. 1954).
18. Id. at 4.
19. 280 S.W.2d 915 (Tenn. 1955).
20. Id. at 916.
21. For general treatment, see Wade, Restitution of Benefits Acquired
Through Illegal Transactions, 95 U. PA. L. REV. 261 (1947); Wade, Resti-
tution of Benefits Obt.ined Under Illegal Transactions-Reasons For and
Against Restitution, 25 TEXAS L. REV. 31 (1946).
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where the defendant was not a party to the illegal transaction, a
majority of the courts have held that the maxim does not apply and
have granted relief. There is, however, a substantial minority, and
the Tennessee court in this case joins this latter group in holding
that no relief will be granted.
